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FROM BIGELOW TO SHAPERO: STEPS ALONG THE WAY IN
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
by
HORACE E. JOHNS*
HISTORICAL BANS ON ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
Modem restrictions on attorney advertising have historical links to early com-
mon law proscriptions -against barratry, champerty, and maintenance.! Such com-
mon law bans, originating during the Middle Ages in Europe, were brought to
the United States; however, adherence to them was not strict. In fact, during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, abuses in advertising and solicita-
tion were widespread.2 As a result, bar associations asserted themselves in order
to control attorney behavior in this area. 3
In essence, the rationale for denying attorneys the right to advertise was to
protect the public from overly-zealous attorneys who might be inclined to utilize
unscrupulous methods to take advantage of unknowing clients0 Five reasons have
been offered to support bans on advertising; (1) protection of consumers from
misrepresentation concerning both price and the likelihood of successful litiga-
tion; (2) commercialization of the legal profession, resulting in neglect of clients;(3) prevention of overcharging and the securing of too many cases by attorneys
to cover the costs of advertising; (4) protection of the bar's integrity; and (5) ini-
tiation of too many lawsuits.5
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Originally the first amendment did not protect commercial speech. In Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen,6 the Supreme Court upheld a New York City ordinance which
prohibited the street distribution of commercial and advertising matter (handbills
in this case). The Court found that the control of commercial advertising was a
legislative matter and that the Constitution imposed no restraint on government
with respect to commercial advertisings
*B.A. (1967); J.D. (1970) Vanderbilt University. Director of Business and Economic Research Center and
Assistant Professor of Business Law, Middle Tennessee State University.
IConrey, Legal Ethics: The Distinctions Between Attorney Advertising and Attorney Solicitation, 22
WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1982).
21d. at 151.
3 Id.
4See Erikson, The Consumers Right to Know: An Analysis of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. and the Effect of the First Amendment Right to Receive Information on
Lawyers' Advertising, 12 NEw ENG. L. REv. 991, 1012 (1977).
5 1d. at 1013.
6316 U.S. 52 (1942).
7 1d. at 54....
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Thirty-three years later, the Supreme Court, in Bigelow v. Virginia,8 struck
a significant blow to the Valentine holding. There, the editor of a weekly Virginia
newspaper was convicted of a misdemeamor by virtue of advertising the availabili-
ty of abortions through New York hospitals to women with unwanted pregnan-
cies.9 In upholding the conviction, the Virginia Supreme Court stated that
"because appellant himself lacked a legitimate First Amendment interest, in-
asmuch as his activity 'was of a purely commercial nature he had no 'standing
to rely upon the hypothetical rights of those in the non-commercial zone."' 10
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Virginia Supreme Court
decision,1' holding that paid commercial advertisements are not stripped of first
amendment protection merely because they appear in that form.' 2 Invoking the
balance test, the Court weighed the first amendment interest alleged to be at stake
against the state's interest supposedly served by the regulation. 3 The Bigelow
Court stated:
The fact that the particular advertisement in appellant's newspaper had com-
mercial aspects or reflected the advertiser's commercial interests did not
negate all First Amendment guarantees. The State was not free of constitu-
tional restraing merely because the advertisement involved sales or 'solicita-
tions"... or because appellant's motive or the motive of the advertiser may
have involved financial gain. .... 14
Nevertheless, Bigelow left unanswered the extent to which first amendment
protection would be "afforded commercial advertising under all circumstances
and in the face of all kinds of regulation." 15
Consumers' Right to Know Emerges
Within one year of Bigelow, the Supreme Court, in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc.16 removed any lingering
doubts about first amendment protection for commercial speech. In Virginia Phar-
macy, consumers of prescription drugs sued the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,
challenging, a Virginia statute on first and fourteenth amendment grounds, declar-
ing it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the prices of
prescription drugs. 17 The Court balanced the state's paternalistic interest in pro-
8421 U.S. 809 (1975).
9 1d. at 812.
'Od. at 814-815.
1I Id. at 825.
12 1d. at 818.
13See Cloud, Attorney Advertising-Recent Update, 8 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 505, 509 (1983); Whitman &
Stoltenberg, The Present Constitutional Status of Lawyer Advertising - Theoretical and Practical Implica-
tions ofln re R.M.J., 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 445, 451 (1983) [hereinafter Whitman].
14Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818 (citations omitted).
'
5Id. at 826.
16425 U.S. 748 (1976).
17Id.
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tecting its citizens against first amendment rights of consumers.' 8 However, the
Court, in applying the test, weighted freedom of speech heavily and placed the
burden on the State tojustify its suppression. 9 Concluding that the Virginia statute
was unconstitutional, the Court held that a state may not suppress dissemination
of truthful information about a lawful activity.20
Virginia Pharmacy was not a case brought from the perspective of an adver-
tiser's right to advertise his product, but rather from a perspective of consumers'
right to know the price of a particular product.21 The decision significantly
strengthened the concept of consumers' right to receive commercial information.
22
In fact, the emphasis on society's right to receive information, because of first
amendment protection, was likely the most important principle coming from the
case. 3 The Court asserted that the "free flow of commercial information is in-
dispensable" as it related to intelligent and well informed decisions. 4
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court made an interesting social observation. It
noted that the statute banning advertising, which was enacted to control a pro-
fession "affecting the public health, safety, and welfare," was actually having a
detrimental effect on those taking prescriptions most often - i.e., "the poor, the
sick, and particularly the aged." 25
Notwithstanding the first amendment expansion of the scope of protected
commercial speech, the Court in Virginia Pharmacy acknowledged that some
forms of commercial speech could be regulated.2 6 Furthermore, the Court was
careful to explain that its holding did not provide categorical protection to pro-
fessional services' advertisements. The Court noted:
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial
advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other pro-
fessions, the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may
require consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for
example, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional
services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced
possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds
of advertising.2 7
18 1d. at 769-770.
9 See Kerr, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: A Consumers'Rights Interpretation of the First Amendment Ends
Bans on Legal Advertising, 55 DEN. L.J. 103, 114 (1978).
20 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
2 Erickson, supra note 4, at 993.
22 1d.
23 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-757.
24 d. at 765.
21Id. at 763; Erickson, supra note 4, at 996.
26425 U.S. at 770.
271d. at 773 & n.25.
Fall, 19881
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Although the Court in Virginia Pharmacy refused to speculate on professional
advertising and the permissible regulation of it, it appears that the groundwork
was laid for Bates v. State Bar ofArizona 2 8 which would begin to define the scope
of permissible activities relating to attorney advertising. Indeed, the Bigelow and
Virginia Pharmacy decisions firmly established first amendment protection for
commercial speech and were to provide the basis for the rationale in Bates to pro-
tect attorney advertising.2 9
BAN ON ATTORNEY ADVERTISING ABOLISHED
The bedrock of the Bates rational was first amendment protection of com-
mercial speech as enunciated in Virginia Pharmacy.0 Justice Blackmun went so
far as to say: "We have set out this detailed summary of the Pharmacy opinion
because the conclusion that Arizona's disciplinary rule is violative of the First
Amendment might be said to flow afortiori from it." 11
The controversy in Bates arose because two Phoenix attorneys placed an
advertisement in a newspaper, announcing their legal clinic fees for certain routine
services. Knowing that when they took out the advertisement, they were in viola-
tion of an Arizona Supreme Court disciplinary rule, the attorneys clearly intended
to test the constitutionality of the rule. An historic end of one of the oldest canons
of professional conduct in Anglo-American law occurred on June 27, 1977, when
a 5-4 Supreme Court majority held that the disciplinary rule was an unconstitu-
tional abridgment of first amendment rights.3 2
Specifically, the Court in Bates had been asked to decide whether the "State
may prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement
concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services." 13 In response,
the Court held that "blanket suppression of legal advertising does not violate the
Sherman Act, but does abridge first amendment rights." 34 In deciding the first
amendment issue, the Court spoke at length about a strict scrutiny test which had
been expressed earlier in Virginia Pharmacy.35 However, the Court in Bates did
not specify the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny, despite its conclusion that
commercial speech was entitled to first amendment protection.3 6 Interestingly,
the Court offered authority for the proposition that in making a determination
whether an advertisement is misleading, a court is required to consider the legal
28433 U.S. 350 (1977).
29 Cloud, supra note 13, at 509.
30 Kerr, supra note 19, at 106.
3 1Bates, 433 U.S. at 365.
32See Kerr, supra note 19, at 103.
33433 U.S. at 384.
34 Kerr, supra note 19, at 103.
351d. at 105.
36 See Lenox, Lawyer Solicitation: The Effect of0hralik and Primus, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 960, 967 (1979).
[Vol. 22:2
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sophistication of its audience, as well as the context of the advertisement itself.37
The Bates Court dismissed the state's six justifications as inadequate to sup-
port the ban on advertising.3 8 Perhaps the bar's strongest justification was the "in-
herently misleading nature of attorney advertising" argument. 9 In dismissing this
justification, Justice Blackmun wrote:
[T]he argument assumes that the public is not sophisticated enough to realize
the limitations of advertising, and that the public is better kept in ignorance
than trusted with correct but incomplete information. We suspect the argu-
ment rests on an underestimation of the public. In any event, we view as dubi-
ous any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance ....
[T]he preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less.40
The Court reaffirmed its faith in the wisdom of the people instead of in the wisdom
of the government to act for the people.41 As in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
seemed more concerned about consumers' rights to receive information and to
make their own decisions regarding it, than in the speaker's right to disseminate
information. Having this concern, the Court was determined not to allow govern-
ment interference with the free flow of information. Thus, the doctrine behind
Bates appears to be that society has a compelling first amendment right to receive
commercial information in the interest of informed decision making.42
The holding in Bates was actually quite narrow: a state may not prevent a
truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal ser-
vices.43 The narrowness of the holding left several unanswered issues. What was
the constitutional permissibility of advertising services other than routine legal
services?" Are advertisements concerning the quality of legal services and in-per-
son solicitation permissible? 45 The Bates court expressly declined to consider the
question of in-person solicitation of clients 46 Furthermore, the Bates decision gave
few guidelines to the states to assist them in revamping their disciplinary rules 47
Yet, the Bates Court did enunciate what it called "some of the clearly per-
missible limitations on advertising not foreclosed by the holding." 48 In this regard,
317Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 & n.37; Alcott, Lawyer Advertising: Permissibility ofindicating the Nature of Legal
Practice in Advertisements, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 171, 174 (1982).
38433 U.S. at 368-379.
191d. at 372.
40 1d. at 374-375.
41 See Kerr, supra note 19, at 125.
421 d. at 105.
43433 U.S. at 384.
44See Whitman, supra note 13, at 459.
45Id.
46433 U.S. at 366.
47See Cloud, supra note 13, at 513.
48433 U.S. at 383.
Fall, 19881
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the Court mentioned restraining false, deceptive or misleading advertisements
as well as "reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertis-
ing." 49 The Court indicated strongly that claims as to the quality of services may
be restricted,5 0 that advertising illegal transactions may be suppressed 51 and that
warnings or disclaimers may be required. 2
Nevertheless, the Bates Court, for the most part, sought to give the states and
the bar a free hand to reform according to decision's general mandates. The
American Bar Association (ABA) and the states began to revamp their disciplinary
rules accordingly. However, most states were reluctant, in the beginning, to im-
plement far-reaching changes.5 3 Consequently, from the initial aftermath of Bates
to the present, the ABA and the states have struggled to protect the public from
deceptive or misleading advertising, while, at the same time, trying to promulgate
guidelines for attorney advertising consistent with the first amendment 4
Solicitation Considered
Although the Supreme Court in Bates, had expressly left open the question
of attorney solicitation, it directly considered the constitutionality of state regula-
tion of attorney solicitation in two companion cases: Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass 'n 55 and In re Primus. 6 At issue in Ohralik and Primus were three competing
interests: i.e., (1) the state's interest in regulation of the legal profession on behalf
of the public; (2) the individual attorney's first amendment guarantees of free
speech; and (3) consumers' interests in the free flow of commercial information
regarding legal services5 7
In Ohralik, an Ohio attorney, went to the hospital without invitation and
visited the driver of a car who had been involved in an automobile accident. While
visiting, he offered to represent the young woman. Also, he visited her parents
and discussed representation with them. Again, without invitation, he similar-
ly visited, in her home, the injured passenger of the same automobile, offering
likewise to represent her. The accident victim in the hospital signed a contingent-
fee agreement with the attorney, while the passenger victim agreed orally to a
contingent-fee arrangement. Although both young women later discharged Mr.
Ohralik as their attorney, he was successful in obtaining more than $4,000 in set-
tlement of a lawsuit which he brought against the driver for breach of contract.
The Ohio Supreme Court later gave the attorney an indefinite suspension because
49 1d. at 383-384.
50 1d.
51 Id. at 384.
52/d.
53Cloud, supra note 13, at 506.
54/d.
5"436 U.S. at 447-454 (1978).
56436 U.S. 412 (1978).
57 Lenox, supra note 36, at 961.
[Vol. 22:2
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of his in-person solicitation of clients.58 The United States Supreme Court held
that the "State - or the Bar acting with state authorization - constitutionally may
discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under cir-
cumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent." 59
Dismissing the appellant's argument that his solicitation was indistinguishable
from the advertisement in Bates,60 the Ohralik Court held that "in-person solicita-
tion of professional employment by a lawyer does not stand on a par with truthful
advertising about the availability and terms of routine legal services." 6' The Court,
then, clearly distinguished first amendment protection for in-person solicitation
from that provided for advertising. 2 The Court reasoned that there is considerable
potential for harm in circumstances such as those presented in the Ohralik case. 3
The court emphasized that the "potential for overreaching is significantly greater
when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits
[a] lay person," than it is when "face-to-face selling of ordinary consumer prod-
ucts" occurs.6 4 Comparing an advertisement and in-person solicitation, the Court
said: "Unlike a public advertisement, which simply provides information and
leaves the recipient free to act upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert
pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing an oppor-
tunity for comparison or reflection." 65 Moreover, the Court noted the difference
in public scrutiny between the advertising in Bates and in-person solicitation when
it wrote: "Often there is no witness other than the lawyer and the law person whom
he has solicited, rendering it difficult or impossible to obtain reliable proof of what
actually took place." 66
To further the state's interest in protecting the public from the potential over-
reaching present in an attorney's in-person solicitation of clients, the Ohralik Court
upheld the need for "prophylactic regulation." 67 In addition, the Court was ap-
parently suggesting a standard of less scrutiny of state regulation when soliciting
for pecuniary gain was at issue.68
In summary, the rationale of Ohralik seemed to rest on the state's interest in
both "protecting consumers and in maintaining standards among members of the
licensed professions." 69
51Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 447-454.
9Id. at 449.
601d. at 455.
61/d.
62 Lenox, supra note 36, at 970.
63 0hralik, 436 U.S. at 464.
64d. at 464-465.
6 1d. at 457.
661d. at 466.
6 71d. at 468.
6 Cloud, supra note 13, at 514.
69436 U.S. at 460; Lenox, supra note 36, at 971.
Fall, 19881
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In Primus, a South Carolina attorney, who was also a cooperating attorney
with a branch of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), advised a group
meeting of women, who had been sterilized as a condition of receiving medicaid
assistance, of their legal rights. Subsequent to the meeting, Ms. Primus wrote a
letter to one of the women who was present at the meeting informing her that the
ACLU would provide her with free legal assistance. The South Carolina Supreme
Court publicly reprimanded Ms. Primus for soliciting a client in violation of the
Court's Disciplinary Rules.?0 The United States Supreme Court held application
of the Disciplinary Rules in this case to be in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments.7
The Court found that Ms. Primus' letter offering ACLU assistance fell within
the "generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved for associational
freedoms. 172 To have proscribed Ms. Primus' conduct, South Carolina would have
had to show that the means employed in furtherance of its legitimate state interest
were "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedoms." 73 However, the Court found the means used by South Carolina (i.e.,
blanket prohibition of all solicitation activities of attorneys) were excessive.74 In
essence, the state was trying to prohibit all solicitation activities to circumvent
the problems that could potentially arise out of some7 5 The Court acknowledged
that the state could proscribe solicitation that is "misleading, overbearing, or in-
volves other features of deception or improper influence;" 76 but such was not the
case with Ms. Primus' letter.
The solicitation in Ohralik and Primus are easily distinguishable. First, Ms.
Primus sought no pecuniary gain for herself, unlike Mr. Ohralik 77 Second, the
Court characterized Ms. Primus' speech as political expression and association,
which calls for significantly more precise (and less broad) state regulation?
8
Third, Ms. Primus solicited by mail on behalf of the ACLU, and in person on
behalf of herself? 9 Therefore, it is not difficult to see why the two cases were
decided differently. The Ohralik Court held that the state may constitutionally
proscribe an attorney from "soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under
circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent;" 80 while,
the Primus Court held that, only through "carefully tailored regulation," may the
State regulate solicitation involving associational freedom of nonprofit organiza-
70 1n re Primus, 436 U.S. at 412.
71/d. at 439.
72Id. at 431.
73Id. at 432; Lenox, supra note 36, at 972.
74 1n re Primus, 436 U.S. at 437-438.
75 Lenox, supra note 36, at 973.
76 1n re Primus, 436 U.S. at 438.
77Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 422 with Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458; Cloud, supra note 13, at 515.
781n re Primus, 436 U.S. at 437-438.
79 Lenox, supra note 36, at 971.
80Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449.
[Vol. 22:2
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tions.8 I Unfortunately, Ohralik and Primus left many doubts as to how solicita-
tion cases were to be decided in the future. This was because Primus' political
overtones removed it from the analytical structure of pure commercial speech,
and because Mr. Ohralik's conduct was so obviously outrageous that the Ohralik
case provides few guidelines for less offensive attorney conduct.82 Two impor-
tant questions remained unanswered. Is in-person solicitation to be prohibited in
all cases? Is direct mail solicitation for pecuniary gain to be totally prohibited? 83
Four-Part Commercial Speech Test
Despite the far-reaching impact of Bates, Ohralik, and Primus, the states re-
mained in confusion over precise tests for attorney advertising and solicitation.
Finally, the Supreme Court gave an appropriate four-part commercial speech test
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Comm "n of New
York.! 4 In Central Hudson, the Court held unconstitutional (in violation of the
first and fourteenth amendments) a regulation of the New York Public Service
Commission which completely banned the utility's promotional advertising8 5 The
regulation was based on the idea that all promotional advertising, promoting the
use of electricity, was against the national policy of conserving energy8 6 In re-
versing the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court noted
that the protection available for commercial speech "turns on the nature both of
the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation." 87
The Court proceeded to develop a four-step analysis to be used in evaluating
the constitutionality of any commercial speech challenges. First, the first amend-
ment must protect the expression, meaning that the speech must at least be lawful
and not misleading. Second, the asserted governmental interest must be substan-
tial. If steps one and two yield positive answers, the regulation in question must
then directly advance the asserted governmental interest. Finally, the regulation
in question should not be more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted in-
terest s8
In terms of attorney advertising, the Central Hudson Court provided stan-
dards to judge the constitutionality of attorney advertising, something that had
been lacking since the Bates decision had ended the ban on advertising. 9 Cen-
tral Hudson continues the proscription of false and misleading advertising, while
8 1 Id. at 439.
12 Whitman, supra note 13, at 463.
83 Cloud, supra note 13, at 516.
84447 U.S. 557 (1980).
8 1d. at 557-558.
86 1d. at 559.
71d. at 563.
881d. at 566.
89 Cloud, supra note 13, at 522.
Fall, 19881
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providing guidelines for regulation of inherently misleading types of advertising
such as in-person solicitation.90 Indeed, Central Hudson gave the states something
precise and concrete about attorney advertising with which to work. Yet, some
state courts did not readily accept the four-part test, and in some cases, they iisap-
plied the test .9
CENTRAL HUDSON TEST AND DIRECT MAIL SOLICITATIONS
After the Bates decision, several states amended their disciplinary rules con-
cerning attorney advertising; among those states was Missouri. The revised
Missouri regulations restricted legal advertisements to disclosure of specific in-
formation categories, and they directed that only specific areas of practice could
be listed, using precise terminology provided in the rules - without deviation.
Also, the rules did not authorize an attorney to advertise the jurisdictions in which
he/she was licensed or the courts in which he was admitted to practice. Further-
more, attorneys were allowed to announce the opening of an office or an address
change only to "lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives." 92
A St. Louis attorney was given a private reprimand by the Missouri Supreme
Court when he published advertisements, listing areas of practice in language
other than that specified in the rules, and listing courts in which he was admit-
ted to practice despite such information not being included among the ten
categories authorized by the rules. Moreover, he was charged with mailing an-
nouncement cards to persons other than those permitted by the rules,9 3 as well
as failing to include a disclaimer of expertise in particular areas of practice as re-
quired by the rules?4 The United States Supreme Court later struck down the
Missouri rules as unconstitutional in the In re R.M.J. case. 5
It has been said that the R. M.J. decision "is to Bates in the context of lawyer
advertising what Central Hudson was to Virginia Pharmacy in the area of com-
mercial speech generally - an enunciation of a workable standard and an expan-
sion of first amendment protection." 96
In testing the validity of attorney advertising regulations vis-a-vis the com-
mercial speech test enunciated in Central Hudson, the R. M.J. Court seemed to
have reached a logical and predictable culmination of commercial speech cases? 7
In applying the Central Hudson test, the following questions should be asked:
1. Does the commercial speech in question concern lawful activity?
9 01d.
91Id. at 523.
9 2 Franck, Lawyer Advertising After the R.M.J. Case, 28 PRAC. LAW. 53, 54 (1982).
9 31n re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
9 41d. at 204.
91Id. at 191.
96Whitman, supra note 13, at 469.
971d. at 468.
[Vol. 22:2
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2. If so, is the speech not misleading?
3. If so, is the governmental interest asserted to justify the regulation a
substantial one?
4. If so, does the regulation in question directly advance that governmen-
tal interest?
5. If so, is the regulation any more restrictive than is necessary to serve that
interest? 98
Actually, since the advertisement in R.M.J. was found to be not unlawful and not
misleading,99 the Court was then concerned with a Central Hudson three-part test,
namely the latter three questions above.
Trying to quantify substantially in commercial speech cases in recent years,
by means of balancing various factors, has generally resulted in an inclination
toward the public's right to receive information. 100 In this same spirit, the R. M.J.
Court decided that the State did not show that a substantial governmental interest
justified the regulation.101
Articulating the development of the commercial speech doctrine as it applies
to professional advertising, the Court in R.M.J. said:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections
of the First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the
advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has
proven that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the states may im-
pose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited en-
tirely. But the states may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types
of potentially misleading information, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if
the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive. 0 2
The general rule, as announced in Bates, was that only routine legal services
may be advertised, and the Bates decision placed uncontested divorce, simple
adoption, uncontested personal bankruptcy, and change of name within those
routine services. 0 3 However, the R.M.J. Court expanded the list of routine ser-
vices to twenty-three areas of law.'0 4
The RM.]. Court deemed the attorney's listing of his admission to the United
States Supreme Court to be in bad taste and potentially "misleading to the general
9 8Franck, supra note 92, at 59.
99455 U.S. at 206-207.
100See Whitman, supra note 13, at 469.
0 1 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205-207.
102 1d. at 203.
103Bates, 433 U.S. at 372.
104455 U.S. at 195-196 & n.6. The twenty-three categories are as follows: Administrative Law, Anti-Trust Law,
Appellate Practice, Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, Eminent Domain Law, Environmental Law, Family Law,
Financial Institution Law, Insurance law, International Law, Labor Law, Local Government Law, Military
Law, Probate and Trust Law, Property Law, Public Utility Law, Taxation Law, Tort Law, Trial Practice, and
Workers Compensation Law.
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public unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to the Bar of [the Supreme
Court];" 105 nevertheless, the Court found nothing misleading in this informa-
tion 106
Despite its far-reaching effects, the R. M.J. decision indicated that the adver-
tisement of other standardized products or services, and that because of this dif-
ference, advertising of professional services has greater potential for misleading
and confusing. 0 7 Hence, a good argument can be made for stricter judicial
scrutiny of attorney advertising than for the advertisement of other commercial
products and services. 08
Another important issue considered in R. M.J. concerned direct mail solicita-
tion of clients.109 Before the R.M.J. decision, the states had pursued different ap-
proaches to this form of advertising. Reasoning that direct mailing was solicita-
tion for monetary gain and was subject to abuses similar to those of in-person
solicitation, some state courts simply proscribed this type of advertising. Other
state courts held that such advertising was protected constitutionally under the
commercial speech doctrine, reasoning that mailings are similar to the type of
advertising Bates'approved." 0 In R.M.J. , the Court appeared appeared to adopt
the latter approach, holding that the direct mailing "to persons other than 'lawyers,
clients, former clients, personal friends and relatives"' could not be constitutional-
ly proscribed. I Nevertheless, the Court, in strongly suggesting that the states
might be justified in more stringent regulation on direct mailing than on tradi-
tional advertising, stated that "mailings and handbills may be more difficult to
supervise than newspapers." 112 The Court went further to suggest two possible
regulations to prevent direct-mailing abuses. First, to avoid frightening an ordinary
consumer, the Court offered the possibility of requiring an attorney to stamp "This
is an Advertisement" on the envelope. 13 Second, to help states supervise mail-
ings, the Court suggested the possibility of requiring attorneys to file copies of
all general mailings with an Advisory Committee.14
By extending attorneys' right to advertise through general mailings in the
absence of strong state evidence as to their misleading nature, R.M.J. rendered
unconstitutional the direct-mail advertising rules of forty-two states.' '5 However,
it is clear that the R.M.J. Court did not explicitly deal with several perplexing
05 d. at 205.
10 6 1d. at 206.
10 7 Id. at 203-204 & n. 15.
108 See Whitman, supra note 13, at 469.
109455 U.S. at 206.
10Whitman, supra note 13, at 471-472.
111455 U.S. at 206.
112 1d"
1 13 d at 206 & n.20.
141d. at 206.
15HParr, Direct-Mail Solicitation By Attorneys: Bates to R.M.J., 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1041, 1065-1067 (1982).
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questions, for example: What constitutes a general mailing? Do general mailings
include targeted mailings? Do they depend on how many letters are sent, to whom
they are sent, and/or what the letters say? What must a state show to establish that
a direct mailing is misleading? 116
Thus, the R. M.J. decision left questions unanswered in the arena of attorney
advertising. In fact, the Court stressed that the holding is limited to the cir-
cumstances of the R.M.J. case" 17 and that the analytical framework of the case
must be applied on a case-by-case basis.' 18 Moreover, R.M.J. suggested that the
State retain some authority to regulate even when a communication is not
misleading, provided there is a substantial interest asserted and the interference
with speech is in proportion to the asserted interest.' 19 However, what those
substantial interests are and what makes them substantial enough to justify regula-
tion of attorney advertising remain unclear. 20
Two important impacts of R.M.J should be noted. First, the Court's finding
of a less restrictive alternative than total prohibition of direct mail solicitation
placed a sizeable burden on the states in future solicitation cases to justify pro-
hibition of solicitation. Second, the Court's application of the Central Hudson
test to attorney advertising provided a standard for the states to use in determin-
ing the constitutionality of their own rules concerning advertising.' 2'
Case-Specific Solicitation Considered
In 1982, Phillip Zauderer, an Ohio attorney, placed several advertisements
in local newspapers to attract litigation clients. The most controversial of Mr.
Zauderer's advertisements featured a drawing of the Dalcon Shield intrauterine
device (IUD) accompanied by the headline "Did You Use This IUD?" 122 The
advertisement cited injuries the shield allegedly caused. 23 It further stated that
Mr. Zauderer was currently handling lawsuits resulting from such injuries and
was willing to represent other women asserting similar claims. The readers were
advised that they should not assume that their claims were time-barred. Final-
ly, the advertisement stated in part that no legal fees would be charged unless the
litigation produced a recovery, and that "free information" was available from
Mr. Zauderer's law office.124
The IUD-focused advertisement was highly successful, and Mr. Zauderer
initiated 106 lawsuits based on the responses. However, the advertisement also
"
6 1d. at 1065.
117455 U.S. at 206; Alcott, supra note 37, at 174.
118455 U.S. at 204 & n.16.
19 1d. at 203.
120Alcott, supra note 37, at 175.
121 Cloud, supra note 13, at 526.
122 Fuchs, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 6 Bus. INSIGHTS 21, 23 (No. 1, Fall, 1986).
123 Thurman, Rulings on Lawyer Ads, Mailers, Residency, Fees and Letters, 72 A.B.A.J., 82 (Feb., 1986).
124 Fuchs, supra note 122.
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resulted in a complaint against Mr. Zauderer by the Ohio Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, alleging that Mr. Zauderer had violated state-sanctioned regulations per-
taining to attorney advertising. The complaint charged that the Dalcon Shield
advertisement violated rules prohibiting the solicitation of legal employment and
the use of illustrations in advertisement. The complaint also alleged that the adver-
tisement violated a rule prohibiting false or deceptive statements because it failed
to inform clients that they would be liable for litigation costs, as opposed to legal
fees, even if their claims were unsuccessful.
25
The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the finding of the disciplinary panel and
Mr. Zauderer was publicly reprimanded. The attorney appealed the state court
ruling to the United States Supreme Court. In the resulting decision, Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the United States Supreme Court continued
its step-by-step erosion of the traditional ban on attorney advertising.126 In Zau-
derer, the Court struck down Ohio's prohibition on attorney advertising containing
information directed at a particular clientele regarding specific legal problems.
27
By a five-to-three vote, with Justice Powell not participating, and Justice White
writing for the majority, the Court ruled that both the legal advice in the adver-
tisement and the illustration of the IUD were protected commercial speech. 128 The
Zauderer decision included a reiteration of the Court's previous stand allowing
attorney advertising, and, for the first time, ties together the problems of attorney
advertising in combination with attorney solicitation of business.
1 29
In Zauderer, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule it promulgated in Bates
allowing states to regulate false and misleading advertising, advertising propos-
ing illegal transactions, or even truthful, nondeceptive advertising, if the regula-
tions advance substantial state interest, but only through means which directly
advance those interests. 30 The Court's previous protection of truthful commer-
cial speech was continued as the Court made it more difficult for the states to
restrict the content of nonmisleading, professional advertising.'
3
'
Commercial speech, that is, speech proposing a commercial transaction, has
only recently been accorded constitutional protection. 132 In Zauderer, the Supreme
Court prefaced its analysis by restating the established rule that commercial speech
is entitled to limited first amendment protection, although the protection may be
125 1d.
126 Orosz, Has Lawyer Advertising Finally Received the Protection It Deserves?, 15 STETSON L. REv. 543, 547
(1986).
127 McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered Questions and Ques-
tionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1985).
128 Stewart, LAawyer Wins Advertising Case, but Reprimand Sticks, 71 A.B.A.J., 84-86 (Aug., 1985).
129 Fecher, Professional Responsibility: The United States Supreme Court Gives Attorney Advertising Increased
Protection - Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 11 U. DAYTON L. RE. 455, 464 (1986).
13 0Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2275 (1985); Orosz, supra note 126, at 563-564.
131 Fuchs, supra note 122, at 21.
132 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748; Orosz, supra note 126.
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less than that accorded noncommercial speech.' 33 The Court retained the distinc-
tion between commercial speech and other forms of speech. The Court felt that
commercial speech, being primarily protected expression as a result of its infor-
mational function, could be regulated to insure the accuracy and truthfulness of
the information.134
The Court's decision left open the question of the degree of protection ac-
corded to commercial speech and the standards to be employed to judge state
regulation of commercial speech. The Court used an approach that balanced the
speaker's relative interest against the state's objectives. The Court's rationale was
that the individual's interest in the free flow of price information outweighed the
state's objectives proffered in support of the prohibition. 35 The justification for
the protection of commercial speech serves to inform the consuming public. In-
dividuals have an interest in price information for their own benefit. The suppres-
sion of that information tends to harm those persons who are least able to obtain
the information in an alternative way. Society has an interest in the free flow of
commercial information to assure an efficient allocation of resources 3 6 Protection
of commercial speech stems from recognition that for a market economy to func-
tion, much less function efficiently, information must be available to consumers.
The Court reasoned that democratic decision-making is enhanced because com-
mercial speech assists the public in determining the proper role of the state in the
economic order. It is better as a matter of policy to "open the channels of com-
munication" rather than to keep the public ignorant.137
The Zauderer decision represents an acknowledgement that the first and four-
teenth amendments protect commercial speech from blanket prohibition,' 38 and
that advertising lawyers are entitled to the first amendment right of free speech,
a right which may be interfered with only when the advertising proves to be mis-
leading or when a substantial state interest exists in support of such prohibition., 39
The Court said that any regulation of professional advertising is subject to two
constitutional constraints. First, the states must choose the least restrictive means
of regulation. Second, in view of the admitted benefits of advertising and the con-
sumer's constitutional right to receive it, any such regulation could not extent as
far as a ban.'40 Because the Court struck down all the traditional arguments of
state interests supporting prohibition (that is, objections in various guises that ad-
vertising has an adverse effect on the quality of service), t41 essentially the only
1331n re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980); see also Orosz, supra note 126, at 563-64.
134425 U.S. 748 (1976); 6 Bus. INSIGHTS, supra note 122, at 21.
3' Fuchs, supra note 122, at 21.
136425 U.S. 748 (1976); Fuchs, supra note 122, at 21.
1371d.
138 See generally Thurman, supra note 123.
139 See generally Orosz, supra note 126.
14°McChesney, supra note 127, at 54-55.
141Id. at 52.
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restriction remaining is the regulation of truthfulness. 42 Thus, lawyers may in-
clude in their advertisements truthful, nondeceptive advice and accurate,
nondeceptive illustrations geared to specific legal problems, and states may re-
quire disclosures regarding fees and costs to prevent deceptive advertising.
43
The court examined Mr. Zauderer's advertisements and, finding that they
inarguably proposed commercial transactions, concluded that they constituted
commercial speech.144 Justice White acknowledged that the outcome in Zauderer
would depend upon the application of the comiercial speech doctrine to the state
advertisement regulations. In light of the Supreme Court cases that had already
rejected the state's ability to employ blanket prohibition on lawyer advertising,
along with its previous approval of the state's ability to prohibit in-person solicita-
tion, the court divided the first amendment question into three issues: ' 45
(1) the proscription of unsolicited legal advice contained in advertisements;
(2) the prohibition on the use of illustrations in attorney advertising; and
(3) the propriety of disclosure requirements imposed on the advertisement
of contingent-fee arrangements.
46
Joinder, concurrence and dissent occurred in various combinations on the
different issues. 4
7
First, a five member majority held that "[an attorney may not be disciplined
for soliciting legal business through printed advertising containing truthful and
nondeceptive information and advice regarding the legal rights of potential
clients." 148 The court reached this decision despite the narrow reading the Ohio
Supreme Court had given its broad prohibitions on self-recommendation and
solicitation. The Ohio court had held only that its rules forbade these activities
142 105 S. Ct. at 2275-81; see also Orosz, supra note 126.
143 Thurman, supra note 123.
144 105 S. Ct. at 2275; Orosz, supra note 126, at 563-564.
45 105 S. Ct. at 2275; Fecher, supra note 129, at 464-465.
146 Copenhaver, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel: Refining the Regulation of Attorney Advertising,
88 W. VA. L. REv. 265, 279 (1985).
147See Orosz, supra note 126, at 564.
Eight justices heard the Zauderer case, with Justice White writing the opinion for the court and Justice
Powell not participating.
On the issue of solicitation and self-recommendation, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, con-
curred with the majority, while Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger,
dissented. Regarding the use of illustrations in legal advertising, Justices Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, Rehn-
quist, and Burger concurred in the court's opinion.
Concerning the issue of disclosure of cost information in legal advertising, Justices Brennan and Marshall
concurred with Justice White's conclusion that commercial advertising disclosure requirements which are
"reasonably related" to a state's interest in preventing consumer deception are properly imposed by the state,
but they dissented from the court's conclusion that Ohio's disclosure requirements completely satisfied the
"reasonably related" test.
Finally, Justices Brennan and Marshall argued in their dissenting opinion that the Ohio Supreme Court's
adoption of the Disciplinary Board's findings without providing Mr. Zauderer an opportunity to present
evidence or assert objections was violative of the due process requirement of "reasonable notice" since it
deprived him of any meaningful opportunity to defend against specified issues. Id.
148 105 S. Ct. at 2279.
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with reference to a specific legal problem. 49
The court not only found that the advertisement was neither false nor decep-
tive, but also that it was entirely accurate. 50 After determining that the first part
of the Central Hudson test was satisfied, the court placed the burden on the state
to establish that prohibiting the use of statements directed at a specific legal prob-
lem to solicit or obtain business directly advanced a substantial state interest.' 5' The
court examined the state's proffered interest in light of the public's right to know.
Justice White found no substantial state interest requiring suppression of the adver-
tisement. First, he noted that a printed advertisement lacks the potential to coerce
the consumer, which may arise during in-person solicitation, as was noted in
Ohralik.'52 That is, no problem of overreaching or invasion of privacy exists since
the trained advocate is not personally present and pressing for an immediate
answer. 53 The reader has time to consider the information contained in the adver-
tisement and then to make a knowledgeable decision based on personal choice.
Second, Justice White squarely rejected the idea that the advertisement could
be suppressed because it might "stir up litigation." Rather, it informed potential
clients of their rights. He wrote:
That our citizens have access to their civil courts is not an evil to be regret-
ted; rather, it is an attribute of our system of justice in which we ought to take
pride. The state is not entitled to interfere with that access by denying its
citizens accurate information about their legal rights.
54
Thus, even if Zauderer's truthful and nondeceptive advertisement in fact encour-
aged other consumers to file lawsuits, it could not justify disciplining Zauderer.
The court also observed that the possibility of attorneys fMing meritless claims
did not give the state the right to ban advertising that contained advice.
55
Finally, the Court concluded that there was no need for a prophylactic ban
on all statements of legal advice in advertising.' 56 The state contended a prophylac-
tic rule was necessary to prevent overreaching, undue influence, invasion of
privacy, and fraud. 57 The state further took the position that the regulatory dif-
ficulties inherent in legal advertising made a prophylactic rule necessary. The state
149Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2276; Parker, Attorney Advertising - Constitutional Right to Advertise in Print
Media, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 8 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 281, 290-291 (1985).
I50105 S. Ct. at 2276; Parker, supra note 149, at 290.
Ms' 105 S. Ct. at 2277; Parker, supra note 149, at 291.
152 Filer, Lawyer Advertising, 61 WASH. L. REV. 903, 907 (1986).
153105 S. Ct. at 2277; Filer, supra note 152, at 907.
154105 S. Ct. at 2277; see Elmer, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio:
States'Rights v. The First Amendment, 46 LA. L. REV. 923, 938 (1986).
'55105 S. Ct. at 2278; Kibler, Commercial Speech and Disciplinary Rules Preventing Attorney Advertising
and Solicitation: Consumer Loses with the Zauderer Decision, 64 N.C.L. REv. 170, 174 (1986).
'56 Elmer, supra note 154, at 928.
'57105 S. Ct. at 2277; Gosden, Professional Ethics - Direct Mailings by Attorneys to Target Audiences, 16
MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 409, 414 (1986).
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argued that the indeterminacy of legal statements distinguish them from statements
about most consumer products since the latter are more easily subject to verifica-
tion. Accordingly, the state argued that the non-feasibility of weeding out the ac-
curate from the false or misleading statements made a prophylactic rule essen-
tial in order to vindicate the state's substantial interest in insuring that ambiguous
or outright false information does not encourage its citizens to litigate.
However, the Court noted that the application of a prophylactic rule to
Zauderer conflicted with the requirement that restrictions on commercial speech
be narrowly drawn to serve the state's purposes notwithstanding the fact that his
advertisement contained none of the vices allegedly justifying the anti-solicitation
rule. Nevertheless, the Court chose not to decide this issue since it was not con-
vinced that the state's rule was necessary to achieve a substantial government in-
terest. The court was unpersuaded that the problems of distinguishing deceptive
from nondeceptive legal advertising were different in kind from those involved
in distinguishing between deceptive and nondeceptive advertising generally. Ac-
cordingly, the Court expressed its continued faith that the free flow of commer-
cial information was important enough to justify the costs of regulating it.158
The states may restrict only false or deceptive statements. Because the adver-
tisement was not false or misleading, the burden was on the state to show the
necessity for an absolute prohibition of targeted advertising. Without a showing
of a substantial state interest in prohibiting this kind of speech, and because the
state was unable to show that narrower means of regulation were not available,
Zauderer could not be disciplined. The accuracy and validity of Zauderer's
statements could be assessed, and the assessment was not so difficult as to justify
an absolute prohibition. 5 9
The Court recognized that the states have a substantial interest in insuring
that its attorneys behave with dignity and decorum in the courtroom, but was un-
sure whether the states had a substantial interest in requiring attorneys to main-
tain dignity in their communications with the public. The Supreme Court was
unpersuaded that the undignified behavior would occur so often as to warrant a
prophylactic rule. 60
Justice White followed the same basic analysis in rejecting the state's blanket
ban on pictures in advertisements: "Given the possibility of policing the use of
illustrations in advertisements on a case-by-case basis, and prophylactic approach
taken by Ohio cannot stand." 6t The court observed that commercial illustrations
are granted the same first amendment protection afforded verbal commercial
speech. 162 Noting that pictures in advertisements "serve important communicative
'51105 S. Ct. at 2278-80; Parker, supra note 149, at 292-293.
59 105 S. Ct. at 2277-80; Filer supra note 152, at 907-908.
16 105 S. Ct. at 2280; Parker, supra note 149, at 299.
161 105 S. Ct. at 2281; Elmer, supra note 154, at 932.
162 105 S. Ct. at 2277-78; Gosden, supra note 157, at 415.
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functions" by attracting attention and imparting information directly, the court
held that illustrations in lawyer's advertisements are "entitled to First Amend-
ment protection, and restrictions on them must survive scrutiny under the Cen-
tral Hudson test." 163 Applying that test, the court found that because Zauderer's
illustration was accurate and not likely to deceive, mislead, or confuse, "the
burden is on the state to present a substantial government interest justifying the
restriction and to demonstrate that the restriction vindicates that interest through
the least restrictive means." 164
Following the discussion of the broader implications behind abrogation of
Ohio's prophylactic restraints, the court's opinion shifted to the much narrower
issues surrounding disclosure requirements applied to attorney advertising.
Zauderer did not fare so well on the other two issues decided by the court. Justice
White, invoking a means-ends analysis, wrote that the Dalcon Shield advertise-
ment should have disclosed that clients whose cases were handled on a contingent-
fee basis would be liable for significant litigation costs regardless of the results
of their suits. 65 The court rejected the stringent Central Hudson test with respect
to this disclosure requirement, concluding that the advertiser's constitutional rights
would be adequately protected so long as the disclosure was "reasonably related"
to the state's interest in protecting consumers.1 66
In other words, when disclosure requirements are concerned, the court will
apply a far lower standard of scrutiny. The majority reasoned that because first
amendment protection rested on the consumer's right to receive information, the
speaker had only a minimal first amendment interest in not providing particular
information. For this reason, traditional first amendment doctrine in the area of
compelled speech did not apply. The majority explained that some first amend-
ment protection against compelled speech in the commercial speech context did
exist: unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements would offend
the first amendment, "but we hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately pro-
tected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the state's in-
terest in preventing deception of consumers." 167
After Zauderer, attorneys are permitted to solicit business through printed
advertising as long as their advertisements are truthful, non-deceptive, non-
fraudulent, and do not propose involvement in an illegal transaction. 6 Zauderer
is important as a reaffirmation of the Supreme Court's recognition of the dilem-
ma created by the public's ignorance regarding legal services. The Court has seem-
ingly laid to rest the dignity interest traditionally asserted as the justification for
163Thurman, supra note 123, at 72, 82-83.
164 1d"
165 Copenhaver, supra note 146, at 281.
166See generally Fuchs, supra note 122.
167 105 S. Ct. at 2282; Goering, Constitutional Law - The Liberalization of Attorney Commercial Speech
Rights - Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1019, 1041 (1986).
168Elmer, supra note 154, at 938.
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the attorney advertising ban, finding the need to inform the public much more
compelling. The disclosure requirement has been approved as a method of state
regulation over the content of attorney advertisements.169
In each of the attorney advertising and solicitation cases the Court has nar-
rowly tailored its decision to fit only the facts of the case, and thereby it has of-
fered virtually no guidance to attorneys who wish to advertise or otherwise solicit
business.
The Zauderer decision increases the bounds within which attorneys may eth-
ically advertise their services. 70 On the basis of Zauderer, attorney advertising
in general, and attorneys use of targeted communications has steadily increased.'
7
'
However, even after the Zauderer decision, there is concern that the limited
level of protection afforded commercial speech makes attorney advertising and
soliciting uncertain, and consequently discourages attorneys from reaching con-
sumers through the media. Consumers ultimately suffer the resulting injury
because they are not offered information about available legal services in the
market place. 172
Zauderer has also been characterized as a larger victory for state regulation
than for attorneys wishing to advertise. The Zauderer Court's application of Ohio's
disclosure requirements when there was no indication of their applicability may
chill an attorney's inclination to advertise, thus discouraging the dissemination
of information to the public. 73
"The Zauderer decision, while resolving some significant issues in favor of
the commercial speech rights of attorneys, leaves at least one important issue
unresolved, the approach to be taken when an attorney makes representations
regarding the quality of services for expertise." 174 Presumably, the test to be ap-
plied will be the Central Hudson test, with each individual representation analyzed
in terms of whether it is deceptive or misleading under the first part of the test.
75
"The rejection of prophylactic regulations also raises the question of the ex-
tent to which the states will be able to enforce a generalized prohibition against
false, deceptive, or misleading advertising." 176 The key to successful enforcement
of generalized prohibitions is to prevent deceptive or misleading advertisements
from reaching the public, rather than to impose disciplinary sanctions against the
169 1d. at 939.
17 0Kasper, Attorney and Client - Constitutional Law - Attorney Advertising: The Expanding Horizons of
Permissible Conduct, 62 N.D.L. REv. 575, 588 (1986).
171Goering, supra note 167, at 1040.
172Kibler, supra note 155, at 194.
173 Elmer, supra note 154, at 939.
174 Goering, supra note 167, at 1041.
175 1d. at 1041-1042.
1761d. at 1042.
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advertising attorney after the harm has been done. One suggested method of
prevention is to require that all general mailings be filed with local bar authorities
for review. The same procedure could extend to all forms of print advertising and
broadcast media advertising. 77
Moreover, an attorney should avoid any self-laudatory statements about him-
self or any attorney with whom he is affiliated, when made for the purpose of so-
licitation. An attorney should be aware of and broadly construe any disclosure
requirements his statement may have, because the United States Supreme Court
has found them applicable even when they do not apply by their own terms (that
is, the Zauderer Court's application of Ohio's disclosure requirements when there
was no indication of their applicability). Most importantly, an attorney should
stick to easily verifiable facts; when advertising with contingency fee agreements,
he should disclose the client's liability for costs and expenses; and, finally, an at-
torney should avoid anything which, by either affirmative statements or omissions,
might be seen as misleading, deceptive, or proposing involvement in an illegal
transaction.178
The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of
lawyer advertising on radio and television. The Bates decision was specifically
limited to newspaper advertising and the court reserved judgment on the merits
of radio and television advertising because such advertising, the court stated,
would present "special problems" warranting "special consideration." 179
Although neither Bates nor Zauderer dealt with radio and television adver-
tising, the principles which the United States Supreme Court announced in these
cases, i.e., the false or misleading standard and the substantial interest test, should
be applicable to all advertising, including electronic advertising. The interest in-
volved in allowing information to flow freely to the consumer is at stake in all
advertising, regardless of the medium used. In light of Zauderer and the other
previous decisions, the consuming public can anticipate an ever-increasing
number and variety of attorney advertisements through electronic means. 8 0 In
regulating electronic advertising, the state is attempting to protect the citizen from
persuasive effectiveness of television .181
Targeted Direct-Mail Solicitation
In a ruling issued June 13, 1988, the United States Supreme Court announced
extension of its approval of attorney advertising to targeted direct-mail solicita-
tion.1 82
1771d. at 1042-1043.
178 Elmer, supra note 154, at 939.
179433 U.S. at 384; see Fecher, supra note 129, at 468, 470.
"O ld. at 468.
t11 d. at 473.
182 Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
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In delivering the Court's opinion in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass 'n, the most
recent in the series of lawyer advertising cases, Justice Brennan explained the issue
as: "Whether a state may, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain
by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face par-
ticular legal problems." 183
The Court's ruling, presented in a bifurcated opinion, 84 is that a state may
not prohibit such advertising.185
Mr. Shapero, an attorney licensed to practice law in Kentucky, wanted to send
the following letter to prospective clients, that is, individuals with foreclosure ac-
tions pending against them:
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this is
true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep
your home by ORDERING your creditor [sic] to STOP and give you more
time to pay them.
You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for FREE in-
formation on how you can keep your home.
Call NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you.
Just call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is FREE, there is
NO charge for calling.' 86
The attorney submitted his letter to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Com-
mission for approval. The Commission disallowed use of the letter, citing Ken-
tucky Supreme Court Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i), which prohibited written advertising
"precipitated by a specific event or occurrence involving or relating to the ad-
dressee or addressees as distinct from the general public." 187 Coupled with its
disapproval was the Commission's asserted opinion that, in light of the Zauderer
decision, supra, the Rule's ban on targeted, direct-mail advertising violated the
first amendment. Amendment of the Rule was therefore recommended.
188
1831d. at 1919.
1841d. at 1917-19. Parts I and I of the opinion address a state's right to make a blanket prohibition against targeted
direct-mail solicitation. Part Il addresses whether Mr. Shapero's letter merited first amendment protection.
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. With respect to Parts I and I, Justice White, Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy joined. Justice Brennan also announced the judgment of the Court with
respect to Part mI, and Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Kennedy joined in that opinion. Justice White,
joined by Justice Stevens, filed an opinion concurring and dissenting in part, expressing the view that the mat-
ters addressed in Part II should be left to the state courts in the first instance. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined.
85 1d. at 1920.
1
861d. at 1919.
1
8 7 Id. at 1919-20.
188 Id. at 1920, citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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In accordance with the Commission's suggestion, Mr. Shapero requested an
advisory opinion regarding the Rule's constitutionality from the Committee on
Legal Ethics of the Kentucky Bar Association. In its opinion, formally adopted
by the Board of Governors of the Bar Association, the Ethics Committee did not
find Mr. Shapero's letter false or misleading, but upheld the Rule as consistent
with Rule 7.3 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct (1984). The Kentucky State Supreme Court then reviewed the advisory opin-
ion. Without specifying the precise infirmity in Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i), the state court
held that Zauderer required deletion of Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) 8 9 and that it should
be replaced with American Bar Association Rule 7.3,190 which provides:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client
with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by
mail, in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing
so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term 'solicit' includes contact in-
person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other com-
munication directed to a specific recipient, but does not include letters ad-
dressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known
to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter,
but who are so situated that they might in general find such services useful.
The State Supreme Court did not explain how the substitution of Rule 7.3 cured
the infirmity in Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i).191
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the blanket prohibition contained in Rule 7.3 is consistent with the first amend-
ment, ultimately holding that it was not, that is, that a state cannot constitutionally
prohibit attorneys from soliciting business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful
and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular legal prob-
lems. 9 2 Summarizing its holdings in the series of cases addressing attorney adver-
tising, from Bates through Zauderer the Court explained that targeted direct-mail
solicitation is constitutionally protected commercial speech, speech which a state
may restrict only to serve a substantial governmental interest, and only through
means that directly advance that interest. 9 3 The Court said "[tihe 'unique features
of in-person solicitation by lawyers [that] justified a prophylactic rule prohibiting
lawyers from engaging in such solicitation for pecuniary gain' are 'not present'
in the context of written advertisements." 194
The state court had analogized Mr. Shapero's letter to the situation in Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Association'" which held that a state could categorically ban
'591d. at 1920.
1901d.
191 Id.
192 1d.
19 3 Id. at 1921, citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641-642 (1985).
194'd.
195436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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all in-person solicitation, stating:
Such solicitation subjects the prospective client to pressure from a trained
lawyer in a direct personal way. It is entirely possible that the potential client
may feel overwhelmed by the basic situation which caused the need for the
specific legal services and may have seriously impaired capacity for good
judgment, sound reason and a natural protective self-interest. 96
The Supreme Court rejected the State Rule's distinction between written
advertising directed to the general public versus targeted advertising, the sole basis
of the state court's disapproval of Mr. Shapero's letter, pointing out that the only
reason to sell advertisements to the general public is to reach a subset of that
population, that is, those individuals needing the service offered. 197
The United States Supreme Court found much less pressure from a letter than
from in-person solicitation by a trained advocate seeking an immediate answer. 98
The Court articulated the test as follows: "The relevant inquiry is not whether
there exists potential clients whose 'condition' makes them susceptible to undue
influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a serious danger that
lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility." 199
The Court found that the recipient of a letter has choices unavailable to one
subjected to in-person solicitation, including setting aside or throwing away the
written communication.200 Moreover, unlike in-person solicitation, the state can
regulate potential abuse of targeted direct-mail, even of personalized letters, by
requiring agency approval and agency imposition of protection, such as requir-
ing the attorney to verify asserted facts, requiring labeling of the letter as an adver-
tisement, and requiring that the letter set forth a mechanism for reporting inac-
curacies.20'
After settling the question of the constitutionality of the State Rule, because
the first amendment's overbreadth doctrine does not apply to professional adver-
tising, the Court considered whether Mr. Shapero's letter merited first amend-
ment protection.20 2 Two bases were asserted in support of the position that the
letter represented overreaching. First, the use of underscored and upper case let-
ters for emphasis was characterized as "fairly shout[ing]" at the recipient to
employ Mr. Shapero. Second, it was stated that the letter contained subjective
predictions of client satisfaction, that is, that portions of the letter stated no af-
firmative or objective fact and instead were "pure salesman puffery." 20 3 The Court
196 Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1918.
19 7 Id. at 1921.
198 1d. at 1922.
19 9 .do, citing Ohralik, at 470.
2 0 Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922-23.
20 1 d. at 1923-24.
202 d. at 1924.
203ld.
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acknowledged these intention-seeking techniques, but found that they represented
no risk of overreaching comparable to in-person solicitation. The Court did note
that a letter's contents could raise substantial state interest justifying its disap-
proval, for example, by offering "overblown assurances of client satisfaction." 
204
In summary, the highest Court has now given targeted direct-mail solicita-
tion of business by attorneys its place under the penumbra of protected commercial
speech.
CONCLUSION
The Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy decisions laid the foundation for the
Bates decision in 1977. Since Bates, bans on attorney advertising have steadily
eroded. Perhaps the strong consumer movement of the 1970s, which continues
even today, played a significant role in the Supreme Court's determination that
consumers, in order to make informed choices, should be protected by the first
amendment to receive a free flow of commercial information - from whatever
the source. Also, the geographics of our society, now largely urban in nature, seem
to favor paid attorney advertising as opposed to mere word-of-mouth referrals.
20 5
Finally, attorney advertising appears to be in the interests of many attorneys and
consumers. Advertising helps attorneys who are striving to build their practices
and striving to compete with more prestigious attorneys, while it aids consumers
in making an informed choice on where to get quality legal services for the best
price.2 06
In summary, no aspect of legal ethics has been more hotly debated than at-
torney advertising and solicitation. The Supreme Court's analysis of advertising
demonstrates its awareness of both the benefits and possible costs of advertising,
and provides a standard for state regulation based on their relative weights. The
benefits include provision of greater information to consumers and furtherance
of competition in the market for professional services. On the costs side, the court
does not believe, as professional associations have alleged, that advertising results
in a decline in quality. Consumer deception and false advertising are possible,
though their likelihood and magnitude are thought to be slight. In light of its
analysis, the court leaves a state free to regulate, but the burden of showing that
regulations are narrowly drawn to address particular problems remains on the
state. Regulation in any event cannot extent to outright bans on advertising.
Obviously, the allowable extent of attorney advertising will never be answered
to everyone's complete satisfaction.20 7 Neverthless, the rationale for close scrutiny
204 Id. at 1925.
2 0 5See Erickson, supra note 4, at 1019.
206 See Cloud, supra note 13, at 549.
207 Id. See also Holtsford, Seven Years of the Bates Doctrine: Progression or Confusion? 7 Am. J. TRIAL AD-
voc. 611, 621 (1984).
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of attorney advertising remains valid - that of preventing false, deceptive, or mis-
leading advertising.20 8 No matter how far the United States Supreme Court and
the state courts go in allowing attorneys to advertise, perhaps the eloquent words
of the late Justice Henry of the Tennessee Supreme Court should not be forgot-
ten: The law is an ancient, honorable and learned profession and its practitioners
are not tradesmen in the marketplace. The role of the huckster, the hawkster, the
haggler and the peddler ill becomes a member of a dignified profession.20 9
20 See Cloud, supra note 13, at 549.
209 In Re Petition for Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 SW2d 638, 641 (Tenn. 1978).
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